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Abstract—Data races are often hard to detect in device drivers,
due to the non-determinism of concurrent execution. According
to our study of Linux driver patches that fix data races, more
than 38% of patches involve a pattern that we call inconsistent
lock protection. Specifically, if a variable is accessed within two
concurrently executed functions, the sets of locks held around
each access are disjoint, at least one of the locksets is non-empty,
and at least one of the involved accesses is a write, then a data
race may occur.
In this paper, we present a runtime analysis approach, named
DILP, to detect data races caused by inconsistent lock protection
in device drivers. By monitoring driver execution, DILP collects
the information about runtime variable accesses and executed
functions. Then after driver execution, DILP analyzes the col-
lected information to detect and report data races caused by
inconsistent lock protection. We evaluate DILP on 12 device
drivers in Linux 4.16.9, and find 25 real data races.
Index Terms—Data race, inconsistent lock protection, device
driver, runtime analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
To improve system performance, modern OS kernels (such
as Linux, Windows and FreeBSD) support multithreading to
utilize multicore processors. Device drivers thus use concur-
rency to efficiently communicate with the kernel and hardware.
But concurrent execution can introduce concurrency problems.
Studies [1]–[3] have shown that concurrency problems occupy
a large part of reported bugs in device drivers, and these con-
currency problems are often hard to reproduce and detect [2].
Data races are a common kind of concurrency problem. A data
race occurs when multiple threads access the same memory
location without proper synchronization and at least one access
is a write [4]. Data races can introduce non-determinism,
and may cause serious runtime problems such as null-pointer
dereferences and use-after-free errors.
Many approaches [5]–[14] have been proposed to detect
data races in user-level applications. To detect data races in
kernel-level device drivers, some approaches [15]–[19] use
static analysis, but they often report false positives due to
lacking exact runtime information. Several approaches [20]–
[23] use dynamic analysis and can detect data races in device
drivers. They are based on sampling or lockset analysis. The
effectiveness of the sampling-based approaches [20], [21]
heavily relies on the sampling frequency. These approaches
∗ Jia-Ju Bai is the corresponding author.
may miss real data races when the sampling frequency is low,
and they may introduce much runtime overhead when the
sampling frequency is high. Lockset-based approaches [22],
[23] detect data races based on the set of locks protecting
shared-variable accesses. But these approaches often report
many false data races, because the related shared variables are
not actually concurrently accessed when they are written.
The traditional lockset-based approach, as proposed in
Eraser [22], is based on the assumption that all accesses to
a shared variable can potentially be executed concurrently
and thus need to be protected by locks. Accordingly, for
each possible shared variable v, globally across the execution,
Eraser maintains a set C(v) that contains the set of locks that
are held across all previous observed accesses to v. C(v) is
initially all of the locks available in the system. As an access
to v occurs, C(v) is updated to the intersection of C(v) with
the currently held set of locks. An error is reported if C(v)
becomes the empty set. In practice, however, it is not the case
that all accesses to a given variable v can occur concurrently
with each other. As a typical example, initialization may
occur before the variable is shared, in which case a data race
is impossible. Thus, the traditional lockset-based approach
results in many false positives.
To address these issues, we refine the dynamic lockset-based
approach by adding more constraints on the set of variables
that are considered and the locksets that are compared. Rather
than keeping track of a global lockset for a variable, we collect
the specific sets of locks held at each accesses. Furthermore,
we only compare locksets of accesses that occur in functions
that are actually executed concurrently, thus providing stronger
evidence that the accesses may conflict. We only perform
this check when one of the accesses is a write and when
one of the accesses is protected by at least one lock (we
refer to the accessed variable as a possible raced variable),
reflecting developer understanding that a concurrent access is
possible. If a variable is accessed within two concurrently
executed functions, the sets of locks held around each access
are disjoint, at least one of the locksets is non-empty, and at
least one of the involved accesses is a write, then a data race
may occur. In fact, this data race is caused by inconsistent
lock protection for the possible raced variable in the two
concurrently executed functions. As compared to Eraser, we
can drastically reduce the set of false positives, because we
only report races when there is strong evidence that a race
is possible. Furthemore, by focusing on variables that are
protected by at least one lock, and are thus more likely actually
shared, we are able to keep the runtime overhead manageable.
Based on the above idea, we propose a dynamic approach
named DILP, to detect data races caused by inconsistent lock
protection in device drivers. Overall, DILP consists of three
phases. Firstly, at compile time, with LLVM [24], DILP instru-
ments some places in the driver code, such as variable accesses
and driver functions. Secondly, during driver execution, DILP
intercepts variable accesses and monitors executed functions. It
identifies and records the information about runtime variable
accesses and concurrently executed functions. Finally, after
driver exeuction, DILP analyzes the recorded information to
detect data races caused by inconsistent lock protection. We
have implemented DILP for Linux device drivers.
Overall, we make three main contributions in this paper.
• We perform a study of Linux driver patches, and find that
over 38% of data-race-fixing patches involve inconsistent
lock protection. This study indicates that many reported
data races in device drivers are caused by inconsistent
lock protection.
• We propose a dynamic approach named DILP, to auto-
matically detect data races caused by inconsistent lock
protection in device drivers.
• We evaluate DILP on 12 device drivers in Linux 4.16.9.
DILP in total finds 25 real data races, and 11 of them have
been confirmed by driver developers. The evaluation also
shows that the runtime overhead of DILP is lower than
many previous approaches.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the motivation of this paper. Section III introduces
DILP in detail. Section IV presents the evaluation on Linux
drivers. Section V compares our work to previous approaches.
Section VI makes a discussion about DILP. Section VII shows
the related work, and Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. MOTIVATION
In this section, we first motivate our work using a real
example in Linux driver code, and then present our study of
Linux driver patches.
A. Motivating Example
Figure 1 presents a fixed data race in the rtl8723ae de-
vice driver. This data race was first introduced in Linux
3.18 (released in December 2014). During driver execution,
the function rtl_ps_set_rf_state can be concurrently
executed with the function rtl8723e_dm_watchdog.
In the function rtl_ps_set_rf_state, the variable
ppsc->rfchange_inprogress is assigned on line 167,
and this write operation is protected by a spinlock acquired
on line 166. But in the function rtl8723e_dm_watchdog,
the variable ppsc->rfchange_inprogress is read as
a condition value on line 845 without holding the spinlock.
Thus, a data race on ppsc->rfchange_inprogress may
occur. This data race was first fixed in Linux 4.8 (released in
FILE: linux-3.18/drivers/net/wireless/rtlwifi/rtl8723ae/dm.c
829. void rtl8723e_dm_watchdog(...) {
  ……
+++.     spin_lock(&rtlpriv->locks.rf_ps_lock);
845.  if (... && (!ppsc->rfchange_inprogress)) {
  ......
855.  }
+++.     spin_unlock(&rtlpriv->locks.rf_ps_lock);




79. bool rtl_ps_set_rf_state(...) {
  ……
165.     if (!protect_or_not) {
166.         spin_lock(&rtlpriv->locks.rf_ps_lock);
167.  ppsc->rfchange_inprogress = false;
168.  spin_unlock(&rtlpriv->locks.rf_ps_lock);
169.  }
170.  return actionallowed;
171. }
172. EXPORT_SYMBOL(rtl_ps_set_rf_state);
Fig. 1. A fixed data race in the rtl8723ae driver of Linux 3.18.
October 2016), by acquiring the spinlock in rtl8723e_-
dm_watchdog.1 This data race persisted over 10 mainline
releases (nearly 2 years).
This example illustrates the pattern of inconsistent lock
protection that may cause data races. Specifically, if a variable
is accessed within two concurrently executed functions, the sets
of locks held around each access are disjoint, at least one of
the locksets is non-empty, and at least one of the involved
accesses is a write, then a data race may occur.
B. Study of Linux Driver Patches
To know about the proportion of reported data races caused
by inconsistent lock protection, we perform a study of Linux
driver patches in the Patchwork project [25]. We select the
Patchwork project, as it is used by a number of Linux kernel
maintainers to collect patches pending for the next release.
We select the accepted patches from April 2015 to April 2018
that fix data races, by searching the patch title. We focus
on the patches of 6 common driver classes, namely wireless
controller, Ethernet controller, sound card, multimedia, MMC
(multimedia card) and RDMA drivers. We get 252 accepted
patches that fix data races. Among these patches, we identify
those that involve inconsistent lock protection. The result is
shown in Table I. The first column shows the driver class; the
second column shows the number of these accepted patches
that fix data races; the third and fourth columns, respectively,
present the number and percentage of accepted patches that
involve inconsistent lock protection.
From Table I, we find that more than 38% of the accepted
patches fixing data races involve inconsistent lock protection.
The remaining patches target data races of other patterns, such
as atomicity violations and forgetting to disable interrupts
where needed. In the patches involving inconsistent lock
protection, most data races are fixed by: 1) adding new calls
to lock and unlock functions to protect the raced variables;
1Patch link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9198639/
TABLE I
STUDY RESULT OF LINUX DRIVER PATCHES
Driver class Race Pattern Proportion
Wireless 52 16 30.8%
Ethernet 50 20 40.0%
Sound 24 10 41.7%
Multimedia 33 16 48.5%
MMC 11 4 36.4%
RDMA 82 32 39.0%
Total 252 98 38.9%
or 2) moving existing calls to lock and unlock functions to
a place that can protect the raced variables. These race fixes
suggest that the fixed data races were introduced because: 1)
the driver developer forgot that the function containing the
access can be concurrently executed with another function
having access to the same shared variable, which causes the
lack of lock protection; or 2) the driver developer remembered
to add necessary lock protection in the related function,
but the lock protection is not complete. Indeed, these two
reasons are difficult to avoid in driver development, because
a device driver often has many functions and complex control
logic [26]. Thus, inconsistent lock protection is likely to be
introduced, which may cause data races in device drivers.
III. APPROACH
A. Basic Idea
To detect data races caused by inconsistent lock protection,
we use a runtime analysis involving two steps. The first step
identifies possible raced variables. The second step checks
all accesses to the identified possible raced variables, by
comparing the locksets that protect these accesses. If the
intersection between the locksets is empty, data races will be
reported.
The first step identifies a variable as a possible raced vari-
able if it satisfies two requirements: 1) it is a possible shared
variable, and 2) it is accessed with the protection of at least
one lock. The second step records two kinds of information,
namely locksets and driver functions that are concurrently
executed. Moreover, interrupt status is also recorded. When
a hardware interrupt is raised while a driver function F is
executed, the device driver suspends executing the function F
to execute the corresponding interrupt handling function. In
this case, we need interrupt status to identify that the interrupt
handling function, not the function F, is executed.
B. Architecture
Based on our basic idea, we propose an automated runtime
analysis approach, named DILP, to detect data races caused
by inconsistent lock protection in device drivers. We have
implemented DILP with the Clang compiler [27]. Figure 2
shows the architecture of DILP, which has three parts:
• Driver generator. This part compiles the driver source
code, performs code instrumentation, and finally gener-
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Fig. 2. Overall architecture of DILP.
• Runtime monitor. This part uses the instrumented code
to monitor driver execution, and collects runtime infor-
mation for subsequent analysis. In order to not modify
the OS kernel code, this part is implemented as a kernel
module.
• Race detector. This part analyzes the collected runtime
information, and detects data races caused by inconsistent
lock protection.
Based on the above architecture, DILP consists of three
phases that are introduced as follows.
C. Phases
1) Code Instrumentation: In this phase, the driver gener-
ator performs code instrumentation and generates a loadable
driver. Firstly, DILP uses the Clang compiler to compile the
driver C code into LLVM bytecode. Secondly, DILP performs
code instrumentation on the LLVM bytecode. Thirdly, DILP
uses the Clang compiler to compile the modified LLVM
bytecode into assembly code. Finally, DILP uses the GCC2
compiler to compile the assembly code into an object file, and
generates a kernel object file as a loadable driver. DILP mainly
instruments three kinds of places in the LLVM bytecode:
• Calls to lock or unlock functions. By instrumenting these
calls, DILP can collect locksets at runtime.
• Driver functions. By instrumenting the entry and terminal
basic blocks of each driver function, DILP can collect the
information about concurrently executed functions.
• Variable accesses. By instrumenting load and store in-
structions that contain memory accesses, we can monitor
read and write operations at runtime.
2) Runtime Information Collection: In this phase, using
the instrumented code, the runtime monitor identifies and
records the calling contexts of shared-variable accesses and
call paths of concurrently executed functions. The two kinds of
information are gotten from possible shared-variable accesses,
executed driver functions, locksets and interrupt status.
Possible shared-variable accesses. DILP performs a dy-
namic taint analysis from two kinds of basic possible shared
variables, namely global variables and pointer-type function
arguments. Figure 3 shows the procedure of this analysis for
a function func. DILP maintains two sets of possible shared
2In some cases, a driver completely built by Clang cannot be successfully
loaded, thus we use GCC here.
1 
Procedure: Identifying possible shared variables in the function  func 
1: shared_set := ø; 
2: foreach  arg  in  GetArgPtrSet(func)  do 
3: AddSharedSet(arg, shared_set); 
4: end foreach 
5: foreach  inst  in  GetInstSet(func)  do 
6: ret_val := GetReturnVal(inst); 
7: foreach  operand  in  GetOperandSet(inst)  do 
8: if  operand is a global variable  then 
9: AddSharedSet(operand, global_set); 
10: end if 
11: if  operand ∈ shared_set  or  operand ∈ global_set  then 
12: AddSharedSet(ret_val, shared_set); 
13: CollectAccess(operand, ret_val, func, …); 
14: end if 
15: end foreach 
16: end foreach 
17: delete shared_set; 
Fig. 3. Dynamic taint analysis of identifying possible shared variables.
FuncA: tmp1 = load var1;
FuncA: store tmp1, var2;
FuncA: call mutex_lock();
FuncA: store tmp1, var3;
* Interrupt handling begin
IntrFunc: tmp = load irq_var1;
IntrFunc: store tmp, irq_var2;
* Interrupt handling end
FuncA: call mutex_unlock();
Fig. 4. Example of interrupt handling.
variables, namely shared set for func and global set for the
driver. Before func is executed, DILP initializes shared set to
the set of pointer-typed arguments of the function. While func
is executed, DILP intercepts each instrumented instruction
inst in this function (lines 5-16). For inst, DILP gets its
result value ret val, and then handles each operand operand.
If operand is a global variable, DILP adds it in global set
(lines 8-10). Then, DILP compares operand with each stored
variable in shared set and global set according to the memory
address (lines 11-14). If operand belongs to either of the two
sets, operand is indicated to be a possible shared variable.
Accordingly, the affected variable ret val is regarded as a
possible shared variable for the function func. In this case,
DILP adds ret val in shared set, and collects the calling
context of variable accesses for ret val in shared set. func
exits, DILP deletes the set shared set (line 17).
Executed driver functions. DILP intercepts the starting and
ending basic blocks of each driver function, to collect the call
paths of variable accesses and the call paths of concurrently
executed functions. It maintains a list that contains the names
of currently executed functions and the IDs of currently
running threads. For example, when a driver function F1
begins to be executed, DILP records the function name and
running thread ID as a node in the list. While F1 is executed,
if another driver function F2 begins to be executed, DILP
searches the list and finds the node of F1. If the running thread
ID of F1 is different from that of F2, it indicates that F1
and F2 are executed in different threads at the same time, so
F1 and F2 can be concurrently executed. In this case, DILP
records the call paths of F1 and F2 as a call-path pair of
concurrently executed functions. When F1 returns and exits,
the corresponding node is deleted from the list.
Lockset. DILP intercepts the calls to lock and unlock
functions. It records the function name and arguments, which
are used to differentiate the held locks for variable accesses.
Interrupt status. DILP uses specific kernel interfaces (like
in_interrupt in the Linux kernel) to check interrupt
status. Figure 4 uses an example to illustrate the necessity of
checking interrupt status. In the example, FuncA performs
a load (read) operation and a store (write) operation, and
then calls the lock function mutex_lock to protect the
store operation on the variable var3. At this time, a hard-
ware interrupt is raised, and the interrupt handling function
IntrFunc is executed on the thread of running FuncA. The
function IntrFunc performs a load operation on the variable
irq_var1 and a store operation on the variable irq_var2,
and then returns. The FuncA continues to be executed on this
thread, and it calls the unlock function mutex_unlock to re-
lease the lock. If DILP would ignore interrupt status, it would
collect two pieces of incorrect information: (1) IntrFunc
is incorrectly considered to be called by FuncA. (2) The
load and store operations of irq_var1 and irq_var2 are
incorrectly considered to be protected by the lock. This is a
form of stack ripping [28]. By checking interrupt status when
monitoring each function’s execution, DILP can avoid such
errors. Specifically, when interrupt status is true, DILP creates
a separate function call path and the corresponding lockset to
record variable accesses and lock usages in interrupt handling.
Calling context. According to possible shared variables, ex-
ecuted functions, locksets and interrupt status, DILP maintains
and collects calling contexts of shared-variable accesses. The
calling context contains function call path, held locks (lock
type and lock object’s memory address), accessed variable
(variable’s memory address) and access type (read or write). It
is used to identify possible raced variables in the next phases.
3) Race Detection: In this phase, with the collected runtime
information, DILP first identifies possible raced variables and
their accesses, and then detects data races caused by inconsis-
tent lock protection. Finally, DILP produces data-race reports
containing the locations of raced variables and information
about the context in which the possible race occurs.
To reduce overhead, this phase is performed after driver
execution. Specifically, DILP records the runtime information
into a log file during driver execution, and performs race
detection according to this log file after driver execution.
Figure 5 shows the procedure of race detection. Firstly,
according to the calling context of each shared-variable access,
DILP identifies a shared variable as a possible raced variable
if its access is protected by at least one lock (lines 1-6). After
that, DILP gets the set of calling contexts of the possible-
raced-variable access (presented as pos ctx set). Secondly,
DILP compares the calling contexts of each possible-raced-
variable access and each shared-variable access (line 7-20),
and reports a data race if: 1) their call-path pair is in the set
1 
Procedure: Detecting data races from collected runtime information 
Input: ctx_set – the set of calling contexts of shared-variable accesses 
path_set – the set call-path pairs of concurrently executed functions 
1: pos_ctx_set := ø; 
2: foreach  ctx  in  ctx_set  do 
3: if  GetLockSet(ctx) != ø  then 
4: AddSet(ctx, pos_ctx_set); 
5: end if 
6: end foreach 
7: foreach  pos_ctx  in  pos_ctx_set  do 
8: pos_path := GetCallPath(pos_ctx); 
9: foreach  ctx  in  ctx_set  do 
10: path := GetCallPath(ctx); 
11: if  ( (pos_path, path) ∈ path_set  and 
12:      GetAccessVar(pos_ctx) == GetAccessVar(ctx)  and 
13:     GetLockSet(pos_ctx) ∩ GetLockSet(ctx) == ø )  then 
14:    if  (GetAccessType(pos_ctx) == WRITE  or   
15:   GetAccessType(ctx) == WRITE)  then 
16: ReportDataRace(pos_ctx, ctx); 
17: end if 
18: end if 
19: end foreach 
20: end foreach 
Fig. 5. Data-race detection with collected runtime information.
of call-path pairs of concurrently executed functions; 2) their
accessed variables reference the same memory address; 3) the
intersection between their locksets is empty; 4) one of the
accesses is a write.
D. Example
To illustrate the behavior of DILP, we consider the Linux
e1000e driver code in Figure 6(a).
The function e1000e_get_stats64 calls a lock func-
tion spin_lock on line 5965, and then calls e1000e_-
update_stats. In e1000e_update_stats, the vari-
able hw->mac.tx_packet_delta is written on line 4970.
Because this variable is accessed from the argument adapter
of e1000e_update_stats, during driver execution, DILP
identifies this variable as a possible shared variable, and
records the calling context of this variable’s access (presented
as CTXq in Figure 6(b)). Besides, the function e1000_-
watchdog_task calls e1000e_update_adaptive on
line 5349. In e1000e_update_adaptive, the variable
mac->tx_packet_delta is read on line 1780. Because
this variable is affected by the function argument hw, during
driver execution, DILP identifies this variable as a possible
shared variable, and records the calling context of this vari-
able’s access on line 1780 (presented as CTXp in Figure
6(b)). Moreover, during driver execution, DILP finds and
records that e1000e_update_adaptive and e1000e_-
update_stats are concurrently executed with the function
call paths (presented as PairPathx in Figure 6(b)).
After driver execution, DILP analyzes the collected runtime
information, shown in Figure 6(b). Because in CTXp, the ac-
cess to variable hw->mac.tx_packet_delta is protected
by a lock, DILP identifies this variable as a possible raced
variable. Then, DILP compares CTXp with other recorded
calling contexts. By comparing CTXq and CTXp, DILP finds
that: 1) their call-path pair PairPathx is in the recorded call-
path pairs; 2) their accessed variables are identical; 3) the
lockset in CTXp is empty but the lockset in CTXq is non-
empty; 4) The access type in CTXq is write. Thus, DILP
reports a data race.
E. Reducing Runtime Overhead
Though DILP focuses on detecting data races and it does
not regard performance as a major goal, we still try to reduce
its runtime overhead. The overhead is mainly introduced by
intercepting variable accesses. We exploit three techniques to
reduce this overhead:
1) Dropping repeated information. During driver execution,
a variable may be repeatedly accessed in the same calling
context. If DILP completely handles all of these variable ac-
cesses, much repeated information will be recorded, which can
introduce unnecessary overhead and complicate race detection.
To solve this problem, DILP compares each calling context
of the intercepted variable access with all recorded calling
contexts, and drops this calling context if there is a match.
2) Separate recording thread. If the runtime information is
recorded in the driver thread, two problems will occur. Firstly,
the driver thread will execute much extra code, introducing
much runtime overhead. Secondly, as writing files in the
kernel can sleep, when the driver thread is executed in atomic
context [29] (such as holding a spinlock) and DILP records the
runtime information into the log file, a sleep-in-atomic-context
bug will occur and can cause system hang or crash [30]. To
solve these problems, DILP records the runtime information
in a separate kernel thread. When the driver is installed,
DILP creates a recording thread and makes this thread sleep.
During driver execution, DILP wraps each piece of the runtime
information as a message and stores this message in a message
queue, and then wakes up the recording thread. The recording
thread fetches each message from the message queue, and
records the information in this message. When the message
queue is empty, the recording thread sleeps again.
3) Buffer caching. To reduce the runtime overhead of
frequently writing to the log file, DILP first caches the runtime
information in a memory buffer, and writes to the log file when
the buffer is full or the driver is removed.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
To validate the effectiveness of DILP, we evaluate it on real
Linux device drivers. The tested drivers are selected according
to three criteria: 1) they should be commonly used in practice;
2) they should be within the driver classes in the study in
Section II-B, which we have found to have many data races
caused by inconsistent lock protection; 3) they should run
as kernel modules, so we can enable DILP by installing the
DILP kernel module before installing the driver. According to
these criteria, we select 12 Linux device drivers, including 6
Ethernet controller drivers, 3 wireless controller drivers and 3
sound card drivers. Table II lists the tested device drivers.
The experiment runs on a common Lenovo PC with four
Intel i7-3770@3.40G processors and 8GB physical memory.
FILE: linux-4.16.9/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c
4911. static void e1000e_update_stats(struct e1000_adapter *adapter) {
4912.     struct e1000_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
  ......
4970.     hw->mac.tx_packet_delta = er32(TPT);  // WRITE
  ......
5020. }
5166. static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work) {
  ......
5349.     e1000e_update_adaptive(&adapter->hw);
  ......
5402. }
5960. void e1000e_get_stats64(...) {
  ......
5965.     spin_lock(&adapter->stats64_lock);
5966.     e1000e_update_stats(adapter);
  ......
5996.     spin_unlock(&adapter->stats64_lock);
5997. }
FILE: linux-4.16.9/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/mac.c
1771. void e1000e_update_adaptive(struct e1000_hw *hw) {
1772.     struct e1000_mac_info *mac = &hw->mac;
  ......
1780.     if (... > mac->tx_packet_delta)  // READ
  ......
1880. }
*** Calling contexts of shared-variable accesses ***
......
=== CALLING CONTEXT === [CTXp]





=== CALLING CONTEXT === [CTXq]





*** Call-path pairs of concurrently executed functions ***
......
=== CALL PATH PAIR === [PathPairx]
Call path1: e1000_watchdog_task -> e1000e_update_adaptive
Call path2: e1000e_get_stats64 -> e1000e_update_stats
......
(a) Part of the driver source code (b) Part of the collected runtime information
Fig. 6. Example of detecting a data race in the e1000e driver.
TABLE II
TESTED DRIVERS
Class Driver Controlled Device LOC
Ethernet
e100 Intel 82559 Ethernet Controller 3.2K
dl2k ICPlus IP1000 Ethernet Controller 2.3K
8139too Realtek RTL8139 Ethernet Controller 2.7K
3c59x 3Com 3c905B Ethernet Controller 3.4K
e1000e Intel 82572EI Ethernet Controller 29.6K
tg3 Broadcom BCM5721 Ethernet Controller 21.8K
Wireless
iwl4965 Intel 4965AGN Wireless Controller 29.1K
b43 Broadcom BCM4322 Wireless Controller 57.1K
ath9k Atheros AR5418 Wireless Controller 87.8K
Sound
cmipci C-Media CM8738 Sound Card 3.4K
maestro3 ESS ES1988 Allegro-1 Sound Card 2.8K
ens1371 Ensoniq ES1371 Sound Card 2.5K
TABLE III
WORKLOADS OF TESTING DRIVERS
Class Workload Description Commands
Ethernet Network configuration ifconfig, dhcp, nmcli, routeData transmission ping, ssh, scp, ftp, wget
Wireless Network configuration iwconfig, dhcp, nmcli, routeData transmission ping, ssh, scp, ftp, wget
Sound Sound playing aplay, mplayerSound recording arecord
The driver code is compiled using Clang 5.0 and GCC 5.4.
For each tested driver, we install it in the system, and run it
with a workload on four threads, and finally remove it. The
workloads are shown in Table III.
B. Detecting Data Races
To validate whether DILP can find known data races, we
first use it to test the 12 drivers in an old Linux version
3.3.1 (released in April 2012). To validate whether DILP can
find new data races, we test the 12 drivers in a recent Linux
version 4.16.9 (released in May 2018). We also count the
variable accesses and concurrently executed function pairs at
runtime. Table IV shows the results of detecting data races.
The column “Variable access” shows the numbers of all
variable accesses (A), possible shared-variable accesses (S)
and distinct possible shared-variable accesses (D) recorded by
DILP. The column “Path Pair” shows the number of call-path
pairs of concurrently executed functions recorded by DILP.
The column “Data race” presents the number of data races
found by DILP. From Table IV, we have three findings:
1) DILP can filter out much unnecessary runtime informa-
tion. For example, for the drivers of Linux 4.16.9, DILP in
total intercepts 242M variable accesses, and identifies 31M
possible shared-variable accesses by using its dynamic taint
analysis. From these variable accesses, DILP in total identifies
and records 1.8M distinct possible shared-variable accesses,
amounting to 5.8% of possible shared-variable accesses and
0.7% of all variable accesses. Thus, many unnecessary variable
accesses are not recorded, which can effectively reduce the
runtime overhead and simplify race detection.
2) The results in the column “Path pair” of Table IV
indicate the degree of the concurrency of the tested drivers.
Wireless controller drivers have more call-path pairs of concur-
rently executed functions than Ethernet controller and sound
card drivers, thus wireless controller drivers have higher con-
currency with the tested workloads. Indeed, in the experiment,
compared to the tested Ethernet controller and sound card
drivers, the tested wireless controller drivers use more code
and provide more kinds of functionalities that can be concur-
rently performed.
3) DILP finds 13 and 25 data races in the tested drivers of
Linux 3.3.1 and 4.16.9 respectively. We manually check the
detected data races, and find all of them are real. By comparing
the results and driver code of Linux 3.3.1 and 4.16.9, we find
that the two data races found in the dl2k driver of Linux 3.3.1
TABLE IV
RACE DETECTION RESULTS.
Class Driver Linux 3.3.1 Linux 4.16.9Variable access (A/S/D) Path pair Data race Variable access (A/S/D) Path pair Data race
Ethernet
e100 16887K / 1937K / 91K 164 2 17189K / 2945K / 391K 217 2
dl2k 16901K / 2972K / 186K 111 2 21513K / 2690K / 144K 103 0
8139too 17607K / 2610K / 5K 68 3 21794K / 3210K / 7K 80 7
3c59x 14716K / 1952K / 63K 85 5 26431K / 3739K / 178K 110 7
e1000e 40420K / 3873K / 179K 938 1 47692K / 4120K / 188K 1155 1
tg3 10632K / 1092K / 171K 1538 0 10046K / 1017K / 170K 1709 2
Wireless
iwl4965 25064K / 3759K / 424K 10369 0 26372K / 3380K / 455K 11721 6
b43 33053K / 6364K / 102K 4318 0 35486K / 6111K / 120K 4488 0
ath9k 24363K / 2694K / 167K 3416 0 26783K / 3104K / 150K 3618 0
Sound
cmipci 927K / 97K / 0.5K 8 0 1153K / 106K / 0.7K 10 0
maestro3 3437K / 389K / 1.3K 31 0 3255K / 362K / 1.1K 27 0
ens1371 3892K / 396K / 0.5K 27 0 4184K / 406K / 0.4K 31 0
Total 208M / 28M / 1.4M 21073 13 242M / 31M / 1.8M 23269 25
FILE: linux-4.16.9/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e100.c









1097. static in e100_configure(...) {
      ......
1148.     if (nic->flags & multicast_all)
      ......
1185. }
1606. static void e100_set_multicast_list(...) {
      ......
1625.     e100_exec_cb(..., e100_configure);
      ......
1627. }
1713. static void e100_watchdog(...) {
      ......
1758.     nic->flags &= ~ich_10h_workaround;
      ......
1762. }
Fig. 7. A detected data race in the e100 driver.
##### Data Race #####
READ: e100.c, 1148: e100_set_multicast_list -> e100_exec_cb -> e100_configure
WRITE: e100.c, 1758: e100_watchdog
LOCK: e100.c, 879: e100_set_multicast_list -> e100_exec_cb -> spin_lock_irqsave
Fig. 8. Example data-race report generated by DILP.
have been fixed in Linux 4.16.9. Thus, DILP can find known
data races. We have also reported the data races found in Linux
4.16.9 to driver developers. 11 of them have been confirmed.
We have not yet received a reply for the others. Thus, DILP
indeed finds new data races.
Figure 7 shows a data race found by DILP in the e100 driver
of Linux 4.16.9. The function e100_set_multicast_-
list calls e100_exec_cb with a function pointer argument
referencing e100_configure on line 1625. The function
e100_exec_cb calls spin_lock_irqsave to acquire a
spinlock, and then calls e100_configure via the func-
tion pointer argument on line 891. The function e100_-
configure reads the variable nic->flags in a branch
condition on line 1148. The mentioned function call path
is concurrently executed with that of the function e100_-
watchdog during driver execution. This function writes the
variable nic->flags on line 1758 without lock protection,
thus a data race may occur. Figure 8 shows the report generated
by DILP for this data race. The report contains useful infor-
mation about the data race, including the locations of variable
accesses and held lock(s) as well as related call paths.
By reviewing the data-race reports generated by DILP, we
have some interesting findings about the detected data races:
1) Many of the detected data races involve interrupt han-
dling. Specifically, 9 data races in Linux 3.3.1 and and 14 data
races in Linux 4.16.9 are in this case. The main reason is that
interrupt handling functions are often concurrently executed
with other driver functions, because hardware interrupts are
frequently raised when hardware devices work.
2) 2 data races in Linux 3.3.1 and 5 data races in Linux
4.16.9 involve function pointer calls. The data race shown in
Figure 7 is such an example. Without runtime information, it
is often difficult to correctly identify the set of functions that
may be referenced by a function pointer, making such data
races difficult to find by statically checking the driver code.
3) The detected raced variables are all data structure fields.
The raced variable nic->flags in Figure 7 is an example.
The main reason is that, to share variables in different driver
functions, the driver often wraps these variables in specific
data structures, and passes the pointers of these data structures
as function arguments. Thus, the driver often accesses shared
variables by accessing related data structure fields.
4) Many of detected data races are caused by reading the
raced variable in a branch condition without lock protection.
Specifically, 7 data races in Linux 3.3.1 and 9 data races in
Linux 4.16.9 are in this case. The data race shown in Figure
7 is an example. Indeed, reading a shared variable in a branch
condition is a small and often-overlooked operation, so driver
developers sometimes forget to protect it with a lock.
C. Runtime Overhead
We measure the runtime overhead introduced by DILP,
to check whether it can heavily affect driver execution. To
quantify the runtime overhead, we use common benchmarks
TABLE V
PERFORMANCE RESULTS.
Driver Original DILP DILP slowThroughput CPU Throughput CPU Throughput CPU
e100 94.1Mb/s 1.5% 7.5Mb/s 12.7% 0.1Mb/s 15.39%
dl2k 94.0Mb/s 2.2% 12.3Mb/s 10.4% 0.4Mb/s 18.59%
8139too 90.6Mb/s 1.4% 43.6Mb/s 8.5% 7.9Mb/s 11.0%
3c59x 94.1Mb/s 1.7% 16.5Mb/s 16.4% 0.5Mb/s 19.7%
e1000e 93.9Mb/s 1.3% 7.8Mb/s 10.9% 0.1Mb/s 11.9%
tg3 94.1Mb/s 1.3% 24.7Mb/s 11.5% 0.5Mb/s 14.0%
iwl4965 13.5Mb/s 1.7% 1.2Mb/s 12.1% 0.2Mb/s 13.5%
b43 12.6Mb/s 1.6% 2.2Mb/s 12.8% 0.3Mb/s 18.5%
ath9k 13.4Mb/s 1.7% 1.5Mb/s 12.7% 0.1Mb/s 15.6%
cmipci - 0.5% - 1.7% - 3.3%
maestro3 - 0.7% - 3.1% - 5.6%
ens1371 - 0.7% - 3.5% - 5.8%
to measure the performance of the original drivers and the
drivers instrumented by DILP. Moreover, to quantify the value
of the techniques that are used for reducing runtime overhead
(described in Section III-E), we also measure the performance
of the tested drivers when handled by a modified version of
DILP, DILP slow, in which we drop these techniques.
For the Ethernet controller drivers and wireless controller
drivers, we use netperf [31] to measure the network throughput
and CPU utilization when sending 128-byte TCP bulk data
blocks (TCP STREAM). For sound card drivers, we measure
the CPU utilization when playing and recording a wave file
for thirty seconds. We test each device driver in Linux 4.16.9
five times, and then calculate the average value of the network
throughput and CPU utilization. Table V shows the results, and
we find that:
1) The runtime overhead introduced by DILP is around 7.2x
on average. The network throughput of Ethernet controller
and wireless controller drivers is decreased by about 1/7.5
(the overhead is 7.5x) on average, and the CPU utilization
of all tested drivers is increased by about 6.8x on average.
This runtime overhead is lower than many previous runtime
analysis approaches of detecting data races in kernel-level
programs, such as Intel’s Thread Checker [32] that introduces
200x runtime overhead and Eraser [22] that introduces 10x-
30x runtime overhead.
2) The techniques that are used to reduce runtime overhead
in DILP are effective. Without these techniques, DILP slow
introduces about 125.9x runtime overhead (281.7x in the net-
work throughput and 9.0x in the CPU utilization) on average,
which is much larger than DILP. The high runtime overhead
of DILP slow is introduced by recording repeated possible
shared-variable accesses and frequently writing the log file.
In fact, most of the runtime overhead of DILP is caused
by intercepting variable accesses during driver execution. We
believe that static analysis can help to reduce this runtime over-
head. For example, by analyzing the data flow and control flow
of the driver code, static analysis can identify the variables that
are never shared between different driver threads. Then, the
accesses to these variables do not need to be instrumented.
This would decrease the amount of the instrumented code,
which can help to reduce the runtime overhead.
V. COMPARISON TO EXISTING APPROACHES
Many approaches [15], [33]–[37] use static analysis to
detect data races without actually running the program. Among
them, RacerX [15] is a well-known static lockset-based
approach that can detect data races and deadlocks in OS
kernel code. RacerX first extracts control flow graphs and
variable information from source files. Then, it exploits an
inter-procedual, flow-sensitive and context-sensitive analysis
to compute locksets in code paths and detect data races.
Finally, it post-processes and ranks the results to generate data-
race reports. RacerX finds 13 data races in Linux 2.5, and 6 of
them are false positives, giving a false positive rate of 46.2%.
Similar to RacerX, DILP is a lockset-based approach, but it
is a dynamic approach and exploits exact runtime information
for lockset analysis through runtime monitoring. Thus, DILP
reports fewer false positives than RacerX.
Several approaches [20]–[23] use runtime analysis to detect
data races in kernel-level programs. Among them, we select
KernelStrider [23] to make a detailed comparison, for three
reasons: 1) it has been used to test some Linux device drivers
and found some real data races; 2) its approach is similar to
that of DILP, namely intercepting variable accesses to collect
runtime information during driver execution and detecting data
races according to the collected information after driver exe-
cution. 3) its source code is publicly available. KernelStrider
is implemented based on KEDR [38], which is a framework of
binary-code instrumentation for Linux kernel modules. During
driver execution, KernelStrider collects runtime information,
and after driver execution, it detects data races according to
the collected information.
In design, DILP has three important improvements com-
pared to KernelStrider:
1) KernelStrider relies on the specific static information
about kernel interfaces, such as the function type and function
name. In the implementation of KernelStrider, this information
is hard-coded. But this information is specific to each kernel
version. By checking the code history of KernelStrider,3 we
find that the most recent Linux kernel version that it supports
is Linux 4.5. We try to run KernelStrider on the tested drivers
of Linux 4.16.9, but it fails because the static information of
many kernel interfaces is not matched. DILP does not rely on
such information, and it automatically analyzes the driver code
to perform code instrumentation. Thus, DILP can conveniently
test device drivers of different kernel versions.
2) KernelStrider does not identify which driver functions
are concurrently executed at runtime. For this reason, it may
report false data races when the involved driver functions are
never concurrently executed. DILP monitors the execution of
driver functions, and identifies call-path pairs of concurrently
executed functions to reduce false positives in race detection.
3) KernelStrider uses the interrupt status to maintain func-
tion call paths, but does not use this status to maintain
locksets. Thus, the locksets maintained by KernelStrider may
be incorrect when interrupts occur. DILP uses the interrupt
3https://github.com/euspectre/kernel-strider/issues/6
TABLE VI
RACE DETECTION RESULTS OF DILP AND KERNELSTRIDER.
Driver DILP KernelStriderDetected Real Detected Real
e100 2 2 6 0
dl2k 2 2 15 1
8139too 3 3 4 0
3c59x 5 5 16 1
e1000e 1 1 85 3
tg3 0 0 47 0
Total 13 13 173 5
status to maintain locksets, which can address this issue. Thus,
DILP can reduce the possibility of reporting false data races
involving interrupt handling.
We also actually run KernelStrider to test the 6 Ethernet
controller drivers of Linux 3.3.1 that are tested by DILP, with
the same workloads (shown in Table III) as for DILP. We
also manually check the data races detected by KernelStrider,
and compare them to DILP’s results. The results of data race
detection are shown in Table VI.
We find that most data races detected by KernelStrider are
false, for two reasons: 1) the related driver functions are never
concurrently executed; 2) the maintained locksets are incorrect
when interrupts occur. Among the five real data races detected
by KernelStrider, one of them is detected by DILP. The other
four data races are not detected by DILP, because the related
variable accesses are not protected by any lock, and DILP
cannot detect data races in such pattern. On the other hand,
12 real data races found by DILP are missed by KernelStrider.
Thus, DILP has a lower false positive rate than KernelStrider,
and finds many data races missed by KernelStrider.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Threats to Validity
The main threats to internal validity are about the lock
synchronization mechanism and concurrency analysis of DILP.
Firstly, because DILP is a lockset-based approach, it cannot
detect data races involving other synchronization mechanism,
such as memory barriers. Secondly, we analyze driver concur-
rency at function-level granularity, which is a trade off between
accuracy and performance. Many previous approaches (such
as [20], [21]) analyze driver concurrency at instruction-level
granularity, to achieve good accuracy and reproduce real data
races, but they often introduce much overhead.
The main threats to external validity are about the intro-
duced overhead and code coverage. Firstly, though DILP uses
some techniques to reduce runtime overhead, it still introduces
7.2x runtime overhead on average in our evaluation. In this
case, the driver concurrency may be affected during execution,
and thus DILP may miss some real data races. To mitigate this
threat, we will introduce static analysis to reduce the amount of
instrumented code. Secondly, as DILP is a dynamic approach,
its code coverage heavily relies on the tested workloads and
driver configuration. In the experiment, we only use common
workloads and common configurations to test drivers in normal
cases. Thus, only some normal execution code paths are
covered and related data races are found. To improve code
coverage and find more data races, we will introduce fault
injection and fuzzing techniques to improve code coverage
and detect more data races.
B. Generality
Besides the tested drivers in the evaluation, DILP can be
easily applied to other device drivers, because DILP works
automatically and does not require specific information of
the tested drivers. Besides Linux device drivers, DILP can
be ported in other operating systems (such as FreeBSD and
NetBSD) to test their device drivers, because DILP does not
rely on specific features of the OS kernel.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Dynamic Analysis
Many approaches use dynamic analysis to detect data races
with runtime information. They are based on the happens-
before relation [39], sampling [40] or lockset algorithm [22].
Happens-before-based approaches [41]–[44] track memory
addresses and synchronization events to infer the temporal
happens-before relation between two events. When two con-
flicting memory accesses α and β are on the same memory
location, and neither α happens before β nor β happens before
α, a data race may occur. For example, Djit+ [41] exploits
vector time frames to track each shared-variable access, and
checks whether this access has the happens-before relation
with prior accesses to the shared variable. These approaches
report no false positives, but they often miss many real data
races, and introduce much overhead due to tracking and
infering the happens-before relation during program execution.
To our best knowledge, no happens-before-based approach has
been used to test device drivers.
Sampling-based approaches [5], [7], [14], [20], [21] monitor
variable accesses at intervals instead of tracking all variable
accesses, and thus they can achieve better performance than
happens-before-based approaches. For example, LiteRace [14]
is an effective sampling-based approach to detect data races
in user-level applications. It uses adaptive sampling to track
infrequently accessed regions in the program, and detects re-
lated data races. DataCollider [20] is a well-known sampling-
based approach to detect data races in the Windows kernel. It
randomly samples a small set of memory accesses. To increase
the possibility of capturing concurrent accesses to the identical
memory addresses, it delays the current thread for a short time.
It also uses hardware breakpoints to set data breakpoints at the
access location to trap any second access during delay. If the
second access happens, a real data race is detected. However,
the effectiveness of sampling-based approaches heavily relies
on the sampling frequency. They may miss real data races
when the sampling frequency is low, and may introduce much
overhead when the sampling frequency is high.
Lockset-based approaches [11], [22], [23], [45]–[47] main-
tain locksets of shared variables and running threads, and
detect data races by computing the intersection between the
locksets of each accessed shared variable and its runing thread.
Eraser [22] was the first lockset-based approach. It performs
binary-code instrumentation to achieve runtime monitoring
of shared-variable accesses for each thread, and detects data
races by checking whether consistent locksets are used. Eraser
can test both user-level programs and kernel-level programs.
However, lockset-based approaches often report false posi-
tives, because they cannot ensure that the involved shared
variables of reported data races are actually concurrently
accessed during program execution.
Our approach DILP uses the idea of locksets but it is dif-
ferent from previous lockset-based approaches. Firstly, DILP
focuses on data races caused by inconsistent lock protection,
and compares the locksets of the accesses to the same variables
in different threads. Secondly, DILP identifies the functions
that are concurrently executed, to help reduce false positives.
Thirdly, specific to device drivers, DILP considers interrupt
handling to reduce the possibility of reporting false races when
interrupts occur.
B. Static Analysis
Many approaches use static analysis to detect data races
without actually running the program. They are based on flow-
insensitive type-based analysis (such as [33]–[35]) or flow-
sensitive lockset-based analysis (such as [15], [36], [37]). For
example, Flanagan et al. [33] propose a type-based analysis
approach for Java programs. This approach introduces formal
type annotations to capture synchronization patterns, and de-
tects data races according to these patterns. RacerX [15] is
a well-known lockset-based analysis approach that can detect
data races and deadlocks in OS kernel code, and we have
introduced RacerX in Section V.
Static analysis can conveniently detect data races without
running the tested programs. But due to lacking exact runtime
information, it often reports many false positives. For DILP, it
could be interesting to introduce static analysis to identify the
variables that are never shared between different driver threads.
Accesses to these variables do not need to be instrumented.
This would decrease the amount of the instrumented code,
which can help to reduce runtime overhead.
C. Symbolic Execution
Some approaches [17], [48]–[50] use symbolic execution
to detect data races. Basically, symbolic execution uses a
symbolic value to replace the concrete value of a variable,
and explores code paths by recording and solving path con-
straints. When exploring code paths, symbolic execution can
perform a lockset analysis and detect data races. For example,
WHOOP [49] is a symbolic execution approach of detecting
data races in device drivers. It uses over-approximation and a
symbolic pairwise lockset analysis to attempt to prove a driver
race-free. It also uses some optimizations based on device-
driver-domain knowledge to reduce the amount of analyzed
memory regions.
Symbolic execution is in effective in achieving high code
coverage for data race detection. However, for symbolic exe-
cution, solving path constraints and exploring code paths are
often time-consuming when analyzing complex and large-scale
driver code.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In device drivers, many data races are caused by a common
pattern that we call inconsistent lock protection. To detect such
data races, we propose a runtime-analysis approach, named
DILP. It uses code instrumentation to monitor driver execution
and collect runtime information. Then, it performs an offline
analysis of the collected information, to detect data races
caused by inconsistent lock protection. We evaluated DILP
on 12 Linux device drivers. It found 25 new real data races,
and 11 of them have been confirmed by driver developers.
DILP can be still improved in some aspects. Firstly, as a
dynamic approach, DILP does not cover the entire driver code
at runtime and may miss data races in the uncovered code. To
address this limitation, we will introduce fault injection and
fuzzing techniques to improve code coverage and detect more
data races. Secondly, the runtime overhead of DILP can be
further reduced. To achieve this goal, we will introduce static
analysis to reduce the amount of instrumented code. Finally,
we only implement DILP to test Linux device drivers. We will
port DILP in operating systems to test their device drivers.
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